In my PhD thesis, I explore the nature and distribution of one cognitive capacity: episodic memory. This is the capacity by which we remember particular past experiences. It is the cognitive capacity by which your cat would remember her escape, if she has an episodic memory capacity. Episodic memory seems to be shared with some nonhuman animals, at least to a certain degree, but to explore whether and to what degree we need to properly understand the relevant features of it.  

 In the first part of my thesis, I analyse the functions of episodic memory. In “Accuracy First: Episodic Memory’s Evolution” (now published in Philosophical Psychology), I argue that it evolved for multiple purposes but first needed to afford attainment of accurate information about the past before it could support other functions, like imagining the future or communicating about the past. This goes against the common view in the literature that episodic memory only has one function. Prominent voices in the literature argue that this cannot be accuracy because our episodic memories are so often inaccurate. In “Misremembering the Past: A Failure but not a Malfunction” (now published in Synthese), I defend the accuracy view by showing the reasons why we misremember that have no influence on whether accurately remembering is a function of episodic memory.

In the second part of my thesis, I consider the memory of nonhuman animals more specifically. Episodic memory is typically construed as a conscious mental state which we experience, rather than just having the information about the past available. However, various comparative cognition researchers argue that we cannot demonstrate this subjective experience in behavioural experiments. In “The Deep Connections between ‘Episodic-Like’ Memory and Consciousness” (won the philosophy of memory essay prize, CPM), I argue that there are various connections between episodic memory and consciousness. For example, achieving accuracy and using that information correctly will often involve processing that is posited to make mental states conscious according to two theories of consciousness. Thus, if animals show evidence of a function to attain accurate information, this can provide indirect evidence of conscious experience. Settling the question of whether animals consciously remember is essential for moral reasons. In “Does Animal Memory Matter?” (manuscript), I argue that according to various ethical theories it is particularly conscious episodic memory that matters morally. This is because, if they remember consciously, it makes a difference to how much pleasure or suffering an animal experiences. However, given the uncertainty in comparative cognition as to whether animals remember consciously (contrary to what I argued in my third chapter), my final chapter provides a precautionary proposal to uphold the moral significance of cognitive capacities, even in light of uncertainty, whether it is regarding features of the ability or uncertainty regarding issues of replicability. Thus, even if comparative cognition research leaves us with uncertainty, under some circumstances the evidence is sufficient to act as if animals have a cognitive capacity, in this case episodic memory.